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Abstract:  
Given the vital and controversial debate on fairness concerns in international climate 
negotiations, the acceptance of a climate treaty may be fostered if the distribution of costs and 
benefits from global environmental protection is perceived to be “fair”. Since an agreement 
must be acceptable to all negotiating countries, it is likely that no single burden sharing 
concept will gain unconditional support from all parties. We have conducted a world-wide 
survey among participants in international climate negotiations to address the question 
whether negotiating weights for different fairness concepts may enlarge the bargaining space 
among heterogeneous agents and overcome the currently dominating self-interested use of 
fairness claims. Even though our empirical results confirm different positions on burden 
sharing among key regions, there is evidence that a broad majority favors allocations that are 
based on a variety of fairness rules. Turning the debate rather towards justice claims based on 
needs than towards culpability may serve as a fruitful starting point to depart from a purely 
egoistic use of equity rules in international climate negotiations.  
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1. Introduction 
Comprehensive approaches to manage conflicting interests among heterogeneous players 
remain a leading and so far mostly unsolved challenge in international climate policy. The 
negotiation process on a post-Kyoto agreement has widely stalled and key parties’ delegation 
leaders do not expect a rapid adoption of a new global treaty with substantial commitments 
from major economies within the next years. Collective gains from international efforts on 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) are likely to be promising but also create strong 
free-riding incentives. Since a climate treaty has to be negotiated among sovereign actors in 
absence of any third authority being able to enforce countries to commit to an agreement with 
binding GHG reduction targets, participation in an international climate agreement remains 
voluntary. The long-term success of an effective climate treaty crucially depends on solving 
this enforcement problem (Barrett 1994). 
Given the vital and controversial debates on fairness concerns in international climate 
negotiations, the acceptance of an agreement may be fostered if the distribution of costs and 
benefits from global environmental protection is perceived to be “fair”. Since international 
treaties among sovereign nations have to be agreed by consensus, it is likely that no single 
burden sharing rule will gain unconditional support from all agents participating in climate 
negotiations. Rather a combination of different allocation principles may be beneficial in 
enhancing the negotiation process. One of the key challenges thereby is to identify a set of 
plausible and acceptable cost-sharing rules being capable to reach consensus and to serve as a 
balanced pathway between the two corner positions: an overarching view on justice as 
fairness behind the veil of ignorance on the one hand and the purely self-interested use of 
equity rules on the other hand. Our analysis moreover adds to the debate to eventually focus 
on few key principles to reduce the complexity of ongoing negotiations in order to lower 
negotiation costs and to enhance the political process (Bretschger 2013). 
Based on a comprehensive dataset from a world-wide survey among individuals involved in 
recent UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) negotiations (i.e., COP 15 in 
Cancún in 2010, COP 16 in Durban 2011) we investigate whether negotiating weights for 
different reasonable burden sharing rules enlarges the bargaining space and may be beneficial 
for future debates. 
The prevalent strategy of the UNFCCC on how to achieve a global reduction of GHG 
emissions so far mainly focused on binding commitments from parties together with specific 
emission reduction targets. That is, member states are required to agree upon an aggregate 
abatement level and to distribute the burden among parties. The UNFCCC addresses these 
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two challenges in rather vague terms: The “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in 
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference within the 
climate system” (UNFCCC, 1992, Article 2) should be approached by parties “in accordance 
with their differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (ibid., Article 3) (CBDR 
principle). The first part of the climate question has been addressed by agreement on limiting 
the global temperature rise 2°C above the pre-industrial average temperature. Whether this 
threshold is adequate to prevent dangerous interferences with the climate system remains 
highly uncertain (e.g., Lenton 2011). Even less consensus has been reached among the 
relevant actors on the second question on how to share the burden of global efforts on 
combating climate change. The perception on the “fair share” in international negotiations on 
mitigation targets differs largely among parties at least due to two reasons: Preferences for 
burden sharing rules on the one hand may be guided by different notions on distributive 
justice, including e.g., accountability, efficiency, need and equality (Johansson-Stenman and 
Konow 2010) and on the other hand may be influenced by strategic (self-interested) concerns 
resulting in a fairness bias between the view of an impartial spectator and a stakeholder.  
Following the terms of Ringius et al. (2002), different burden sharing rules such as “equal per 
capita emissions”, “equal percentage reduction of emissions”, “ability-to-pay” or “polluter-
pays” have dominated the recent political and academic debate. Empirical studies on the 
judgment of different allocation rules reveal heterogeneous preferences among participants in 
international climate negotiations (Lange et al. 2007, Hjerpe et al. 2011) and confirm 
tendencies of a self-interested use of these principles. Lange et al. (2010) find that agents in 
different regions in general support equity principles that are in line with material self-
interest, i.e. imposing lower costs on their respective geographical region.  
To answer the question on which burden sharing rules should guide the future process 
towards an international climate agreement, survey-based investigations among stakeholders 
so far focused on those principles that have been stated most frequently (Lange et al. 2007) or 
those inducing simultaneously the highest support and the lowest opposition rates (Hjerpe et 
al. 2011). The approach of combining different distribution rules was taken up by the 
European Union (EU) in its pre-Kyoto negotiations, see Aidt and Greiner (2002) for an 
overview. In an early stage of the Kyoto process, the EU pledged a 10% reduction of EU-
wide emissions to show leadership in the upcoming UNFCCC negotiations. This aggregate 
(“bubble”) target was distributed among EU member states according to the “triptych 
approach” that was advocated by the Dutch presidency. It basically combines an egalitarian 
rule (for the domestic sector), a grandfathering approach (for energy-intensive heavy industry 
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to address existing industry structures) and certain quotas for renewable energies in the 
electricity sector. Even though this burden sharing rule was not identical with the final 
outcome of agreement in the Kyoto protocol, it was perceived as being useful to facilitate 
negotiation process at the European level. Further examples for combinations of different 
burden sharing concepts to successfully address social dilemma situations include transferable 
harvest quota negotiated for Lake Erie in the 1980s (Berkes and Pocock 1987). 
We address the question whether turning discussions rather towards bundles of different 
fairness rules than aiming at tying all agents to one single rule facilitates negotiations in terms 
of departing from the currently strictly (self-interested) strategic claims on certain fairness 
principles. Thereby we analyze how preferences differ among key regions that may play an 
important role in international climate negotiations. 
Our empirical results confirm controversies on burden sharing in current international climate 
negotiations but at the same time provide insights that add some important notions to previous 
discussions. Even though the suggested weights differ among participants, there is evidence 
that negotiators from key regions support a variety of fairness rules to certain extent. 
Negotiating weights for burden sharing rules may therefore help to enlarge the bargaining 
space among diverse positions. Turning political debates on burden sharing more towards 
needs (ability-to-pay principle) rather than towards culpabilities (polluter-pays principle) 
leads to a more consistent view on fairness and therefore may serve as a fruitful starting point 
to depart from a purely egoistic use of equity rules in international climate negotiations and to 
guide the future process. 
In the first part of the paper we discuss the ethical background of different fairness concepts 
that are currently discussed in international climate negotiations. We further give a short 
summary of the corresponding discussions in UNFCCC and Kyoto negotiations and 
summarize the existing empirical literature. We describe the data and our empirical strategy 
together with a discussion of the corresponding estimation results in part 3. The last chapter 
concludes and summarizes our main findings. 
2. Notions of fairness in international climate policy 
2.1. Ethical Background 
The classic literature of public finance already provides an extensive discussion on 
requirements for acceptable cost-sharing rules for the provision of public goods dating back to 
early contributions, e.g., by Wicksell (1896, 1958). In his seminal essay on the principle of 
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voluntary consent and unanimity, Wicksell (1958: p. 91) requires public expenditures ever be 
voted upon to simultaneously determine the means of covering their costs. Following this 
concept, Wicksell suggests unanimity-voting on public expenditures with an underlying 
taxation according to benefits – that is proportionality or equivalence between value and 
countervalue – as a justification for tax distributions. Wicksell’s unanimity rule is later on 
taken into consideration in Rawls’ fairness criterion in his “Theory of Justice”. Following 
Rawls’ interpretation of the unanimity rule, a consensus with respect to a certain burden 
sharing concept is to be considered as a necessary condition for the provision of a public 
good: If no consensus can be reached, “the suggested expenditure is wasteful and should not 
be undertaken (Rawls 1999: p. 250). For practical reasons, Wicksell relaxes the principle of 
absolute unanimity to approximate unanimity such as three-fourth, five-sixths, or nine-tenth 
majority voting in the subsequent part of his work to ensure agreement on proposals that are 
capable of being combined (Wicksell 1958: p. 92). Buchholz and Peters (2005) provide a 
formal theoretical description of the equivalence principle for distributing tax shares. As a 
central result of their theorem, a distribution scheme for the provision of a public good will 
not be accepted unanimously by all agents if the cost-sharing approach was motivated by the 
(self-serving) desire of some parties to reduce own contribution levels to the public good in 
order to increase private consumption. 
The burden sharing rules that are currently discussed in international climate policy result 
from different theories of distributive justice. Following the classification of Konow (2003), 
mainly two different theoretical categories may inspire different views on fair allocation rules: 
equity and desert and equality and need. Following the ideas of Aristotle and Locke, justice 
principles in the class of equity and desert theory highlight the dependence of fair allocations 
and individual actions. While equity theory mainly focusses on the proportionality between 
output (the potential consequences an individual faces from this allocation) and input (the 
participant’s contribution), desert theory turns towards responsibility and states that only 
differences owing to effort are fair. These ideas of proportionality and responsibility have 
inspired the accountability principle that requires “that a person’s entitlement or fair 
allocation (e.g., of income) varies in proportion to the relevant variables which he can 
influence (e.g., work effort), but not according to those which he cannot reasonably influence 
(e.g., a physical handicap)”(Konow 1996: p. 14). In terms on environmental policy those who 
engage in emission reductions should benefit proportionately or, in other words, mitigation 
costs should be distributed in proportion to the emissions. Therefore, following this concept, 
an equal initial right to pollute (egalitarian rule) seems most adequate “since it is hard to argue 
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that some individuals have earned the right to pollute more than others” (Johansson-Stenman 
2010, p: 152). The egalitarian principle if often described as a focal point in negotiations on 
burden sharing due to its simplicity and pragmatism (e.g., Brown 2014). 
Calls for responsibility are frequently used to legitimate a justice norm that requires those 
who make use of a resource (the capacity of the atmosphere) should compensate the “owners” 
(the public). In terms of burden sharing rules this idea is captured by the idea of the “polluter-
pays” rule that has been announced in a number of international agreements, e.g. within the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 1972) and within the 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on environmental liability with 
regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage (2004/35/CE) (EC 2004). 
Responsibility concerns in global climate protection inevitably initiate a debate on 
responsibility of current generations for historical emissions. It is often claimed that people in 
industrialized countries should be accountable for the emissions of their ancestors (e.g., 
Neumayer 2000). For instance, during the first COP in 1995, when governments submitted 
burden sharing proposals that should accompany the Kyoto negotiation process, the Brazilian 
delegation suggested a burden sharing rule based on accumulated emissions since the 
industrial revolution (UNFCCC 1995). The philosophical literature on historic responsibility 
provides a differentiated view on historical responsibility in climate justice. Critical remarks 
include the argument that strict liability (responsibility irrespective of culpability) is not 
applicable to claim historical responsibility because the descendants of past emitters from 
developed countries may insist that current living conditions in poor countries would be even 
worth without an (carbon intensive) process of industrialization in Western countries 
(Schüßler 2011). Moreover it is argued that strict liability would require an avoidance option 
(“opt-out”) with respect to liability risks which had not been given for historic emitters. 
Instead of harm-related accounts of historic responsibility the discussion often turns towards a 
more benefit-orientated position (beneficiary-pays rule). Following this argument, profits 
from harmful past activities that may still accrue in present times, e.g. within the 
technological progress and the transition from dirty to clean technologies, may lead to claims 
for redistribution ignoring the question of culpability for those actions. As opposed to this, 
Leist (2011) and Schüßler (2011) object that individuals cannot morally be forced to 
compensate others if they did not have information on the risks of their actions in advance. 
This view may be additionally backboned by the tendency of increasing and widespread 
global benefits (e.g., by technology transfer) that may be traced back to carbon intensive 
developments during the industrialization in a small number of countries. All the arguments 
5 
related to the concept of excusable ignorance (e.g., Caney 2006), stating that there was no 
way for past generations in which they could have known that their action was harmful to 
future generations, are crucially influenced by consensus on the relevant cut-off point for 
widely accepted scientific knowledge on climate change. Among others, Caney (2006) and 
Leist (2011) suggest the first IPCC assessment report in 1990 as the appropriate reference 
point; others (e.g., Neumayer 2000) refer to earlier dates. 
Justice concepts in the class of equality and need especially pay attention to the wellbeing of 
the least well-off members of the society. Therein, egalitarism which is probably the oldest 
concept of justice links equity with equality of outcomes. Moreover, egalitarism “emerge[s] 
as a special case within a more general system, i.e., the uncontroversial concept of “treating 
equals equally”” (Konow 2003: p. 1195). The ideas of Rawls and the Social Contract rather 
focus on agreements for the basic structure of the society behind a veil of ignorance including 
the difference principle (maximin rule) as one of the leading outcomes of the Social Contract. 
Another important concept of fairness includes the need principle requiring a satisfaction of 
basic needs such as food, shelter and clothes for all individuals even if this minimum 
threshold cannot be achieved by the own efforts. This approach shifts abatement costs mainly 
towards the developed countries with high economic capacities. This corresponds to an 
equality norm dating back to Mill’s concept of “equality of sacrifice” (Mill 1848) being 
initially advocated as a principle for tax distributions aiming at harmonizing payoffs among 
citizens (ability-to-pay rule). In contrast, an equality rule concerning contributions may be 
rather consistent with an equal percentage reduction of emissions (sovereignty or 
grandfathering rule). The satisfaction of basic needs stimulates the debate on the 
misappropriation of the atmosphere as an ownerless common good. In this sense the standard 
Lockean view of leaving others with ‘enough and as good as” might serve as an argument for 
shifting the burden for mitigation efforts towards the developed countries: Since the capacity 
of the atmosphere is limited and the developed countries already used it as a sink for GHG 
emissions, remaining capacities should be available for poor countries to catch up or, put it in 
another way, rich countries should compensate developing countries for the misappropriation 
of a good that belongs to humanity as a whole. In contrast, Posner and Weisbach (2010) argue 
that the equal right of satisfying basic needs does not always and necessarily require equal 
access to the global carbon sink but inter alia depends on local requirements and conditions. 
Wicksell (1958) argues that the ability-to-pay principle in contrast to taxation according to 
benefits can determine only the distribution of the burden but “has nothing whatever to say on 
the absolute amount of the total tax bill (and hence of the individual’s tax bill)” (Wicksell 
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1958, p. 75). Hence, according to Wicksell, an important requirement for the justification of 
the ability-to-pay rule is that the aggregated provision level has been indisputably 
predetermined between all agents involved in the negotiation process. As described in the 
previous section, there is still a vital debate on aggregate GHG abatement levels to avoid 
dangerous interferences within the climate system. 
2.2. Discussions on burden sharing in the Kyoto process  
Equity concerns and calls for fair burden sharing are repeatedly highlighted in UNFCCC 
documents. In particular, the CBDR principle often serves as a focal point for justice claims. 
It requires “developed country Parties [to] take the lead in combating climate change […]” 
(UNFCCC 1992, Article 3.1) and it stresses that “the specific needs and special circumstances 
of developing country Parties […] that would have to bear a disproportionate or abnormal 
burden under the Convention, should be given full consideration.” (ibid, Article 3.2). While 
the CBDR classification calls for the “widest possible cooperation by all countries”, it leaves 
considerable room for interpretation on who belongs to which of the two groups and how to 
deal with all actors that are in between the developing and the developed countries. Moreover, 
it becomes clear that discussions on burden sharing should be guided rather by a bundle of 
different fairness norms rather than by one single principle since the Framework Convention 
explicitly addresses ‘responsibility’ (for historical and current emissions), ‘need’ (for 
development) and ‘cost-effectiveness’.  
Inspired by the proposal of the first international climate change conference in Toronto in 
June 1988 where calls for a reduction in global GHG emissions by 20% of 1988 levels by the 
year 2005 emerged (“Toronto target”, see WCCA 1988), diverging pathways towards future 
negotiations boiled down to binding commitments from parties together with specific 
emission reduction targets (Barrett 1998). In the following, after the IPCC 1990 report was 
published, some OECD countries started to pledge individual commitments. Pledges were 
calculated to meet the Toronto target (Austria, Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg, New Zealand), 
to stabilize emissions by the year 2000 compared to a certain base year (Norway, Finland, 
Switzerland, UK), to stabilize per-capita-emissions (France, Japan), to reduce emissions by a 
certain percentage rate (Netherland, Germany), or at least to limit future emissions growth 
(Spain) (ibid.) 
An Ad-hoc group was established to define possible definitions for burden sharing approaches 
among Annex-I countries (UNFCCC 1996). Different approaches were discussed among the 
parties. A uniform or flat rate reduction target (grandfathering principle) was considered to 
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facilitate negotiations in contrast to a differentiated approach. The fairness consideration of 
this concept was based on the idea that progress in development is measured in terms of a 
country’s own national emissions in the corresponding base year. This rule initially received 
support from negotiators from many key regions, such as AOSIS (Alliance of Small Islands 
States), EU, G77 (loose coalition of mainly developing countries at the United Nations), 
China, US, and Canada. Other parties (among them Australia, Hungary, Iceland, Japan, 
Norway, Switzerland, Brazil) favored a more differentiated burden sharing scheme, e.g. like 
the Brazilian proposal calling for taking into account historical responsibilities (polluter-pays 
principle). Other possible indicators for differentiation included national emissions, i.e., on a 
per-capita base (egalitarian principle), national circumstances like physical and demographic 
characteristics, or cost-based differentiation (ability-to-pay principle), e.g., in terms of 
equalizing costs of action in terms of marginal or absolute values. During the ongoing 
negotiation process, opposition against uniform reduction targets grew and the debate turned 
toward differentiation in terms of pledging individual targets. In an early stage, individual 
proposals were set by France, Germany, Switzerland, the UK and Zaire. Other countries (e.g., 
Japan) informally announced their targets but major emitters (e.g., US, China, Canada) 
avoided proposing own submissions in official documents (see UNFCCC 2000 for a textual 
history of the Kyoto protocol and national emission targets). During the following plenary 
meetings the chairman of the negotiation process decided to assign his own reduction targets 
(in percent of 1990 GHG emissions up to 2012) based on available information on negotiation 
positions and to reach an aggregate target of about 5% GHG reduction from 1990 levels in the 
first commitment period (2008 – 2012). The EU target (−8%) was set between the own 
pledge (−15% by 2010) and the US proposal on stabilization of emissions at 1990 levels in 
2005 (±0%). EU accession countries (Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Monaco) received the same 
percentage target as EU. Russia and the Ukraine as countries in transition negotiated a weaker 
targets (−5%). The US target (−5%) was set in line with the Russian obligation; Japan 
received a slightly lower target (−4.5%) and Canada the same target as the USA and Russia. 
Other countries were allowed to stabilize or increase their emissions due to the small size of 
the economy and low emission baselines (Iceland, +10%), national sinks (New Zealand, ±0%). Furthermore, Australia and Norway were given a +5% target. Out of these proposals, 
Canada (−6%), Japan (−6%), Norway (+1%) and the US (−7%) accepted a stronger target 
while Australia (+8%), Russia (±0%) and the Ukraine (±0%) achieved lower commitments.  
An early draft of the consolidated negotiating text of the Kyoto Protocol included the 
possibility of agreeing upon a collective emission reduction target first and differentiated 
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targets to be negotiated later (UNFCCC 2000). This approach was again removed from the 
agenda quickly since all countries opposed to ratify a protocol without knowing exactly their 
individual obligations. Barrett (1998) argues that this “bubble approach” further would have 
created strong free-riding incentives and failed to meet the self-enforcement criterion. 
2.3. Empirical Literature on Preferences for Burden Sharing Rules 
Several recent empirical papers address the question of preferences for burden sharing rules of 
international policy makers involved in climate change discussions. Lange et al. (2007) have 
conducted a world-wide survey of more than 200 participants in international climate 
negotiations (negotiators and observers). They find strong support for the polluter-pays 
principle by half of the participants. In accordance to economic self-interest, survey 
participants from developed countries are less likely to support the polluter-pays or the 
ability-to-pay principle. Similarly, a burden sharing rules that imposes an exemption from any 
mitigation obligation until a certain threshold in terms of GDP per capita is reached is 
strongly favored by less industrialized countries. Interestingly, in contrast to pure economic 
self- interest, support for an egalitarian approach is widely independent of economic 
performance. Hjerpe et al (2011) surveyed 500 participants at COP-15 in Copenhagen in 2009 
on their support for different burden sharing schemes. In line with the consensus principle in 
many international environmental agreements, they conclude that a burden sharing rule 
offering a high probability of agreement should be denoted by high support rates and low 
opposition at the same time. Similarly to Lange et al. (2007), the authors find strong support 
for the ability-to-pay rule and the polluter-pays-rule including historic emissions since 1990. 
With respect to the supporter and opponent concept, their study suggests that the ability-to-
pay rule seems most promisingly to successfully guide the negotiation process on allocating 
mitigation obligations.  
Instead of identifying preferences for burden sharing rules on the level of policy makers, 
Carlsson et al. (2010) have conducted a similar survey among citizens in the US and China in 
2009. According to economic intuition, US citizens favor a polluter-pays rule based on 
current emissions and Chinese respondents prefer a scheme based on historical emissions. 
All these results raise the question to which degree justice arguments deviate from the view of 
the impartial spectator and are rather used to legitimate a burden sharing rule that is consistent 
with material self-interest. The dissonance between the spectator and the stakeholder views is 
often referred to as a “fairness bias” (e.g, Johansson-Stenman and Konow 2010). This 
distortion of the use of fairness norms may “contribute to the frequent conclusion that justice 
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is merely a ploy, a vacuous concept used opportunistically by self-interested and self-serving 
agents” (Konow 2000, p. 1072). Lange et al. (2010) report evidence for fairness bias among 
agents involved in international climate policy. The empirical results support the hypothesis 
that the individual perception of burden sharing rules is influenced by the associated 
economic costs and benefits and largely are consistent with material self-interest. 
Interestingly, according to their study, the strategic use of equity concerns differs among 
regions. While stated preferences for negotiators from EU, Russia and the USA are fully 
consistent with self-interest, individuals from G77/China support the ability-to-pay and 
polluter-pays rule and therefore their position deviates from the prediction (egalitarian rule). 
Carlsson et al. 2011 extend the empirical research of a fairness bias on a group level by 
elicitating preferences for burden sharing rules among 400 Swedish citizens in a choice 
experiment. The choice attributes were given by a certain burden sharing rule (polluter-pays 
based on historical or current emissions, egalitarian rule) with the respective mitigation 
requirements for USA, EU, China and associated with the respective yearly cost for the own 
household until 2050. Anonymizing country labels does not alter decision behavior 
significantly and therefore no evidence of an ingroup bias can found in the data. The 
respondents prefer an egalitarian rule with equal per capita emissions although this implies 
higher cost for them. 
3. Empirical analysis 
3.1. Empirical strategy  
Both the review on the philosophical and the empirical literature suggest that no single rule is 
expected to dominate the negotiation process but rather a mixed approach with different 
reasonable burden sharing rules may facilitate cooperation in a future climate treaty. In our 
empirical analysis we therefore focus on individual preferences for bundles consisting of 
different burden sharing rules. 
Recent developments in aspiration based bargaining modelling (Ahlert and Lajtos 2011, 
Ahlert, 2007) apply fundamental concepts from aspiration level theory (Selten 1998) to study 
the bargaining process in (international) negotiations. Empirical applications include a study 
on the WTO Agricultural Negotiations of the Doha Round (Lajtos 2010). The main idea of 
this concept is to model negotiations as adaptation processes being characterized by a 
successive exchange of reciprocal concessions (Ahlert and Lajtos 2011: p.6). The different 
proposals crucially depend on certain aspiration levels such as the planned goal, the lowest 
10 
acceptable agreement and the planned (threat to) break off negotiations (Ahlert 2007). 
Experimental evidence suggests aspiration levels not only to affect the distribution of payoffs 
but also highlights the effect of opponents’ behavior (e.g., the first proposal) on own 
aspiration formation (Liebert et al. 1968). There is little empirical evidence on how other 
related factors such as economic circumstances, the need for an agreement, experiences from 
previous negotiations and expectations on opponents’ behavior may affect bargaining 
positions in negotiations (Ahlert and Lajtos 2011). 
We consider the assessment of weights for different burden sharing rule as a possibility to 
observe first concessions from negotiating partners. In a first step we investigate whether 
participants make use of diversification and include several fairness rules within their 
preferred bundle. This enables us to better understand whether negotiators rather persist in a 
corner position or if bundles reflect tendencies of enlarging the bargaining space and sending 
a signal to opponents in negotiations. Moreover, this provides insights whether the size of 
bundles differs between key players, i.e. if powerful agents are more likely to avoid an 
agreement with differentiated burden sharing mechanisms to accelerate the process. 
Analogously, we investigate whether the perceived need for an agreement, i.e. for vulnerable 
countries, fosters agents to depart from the purely egoistic position.  
Following the typology of Rose et al. (1998) and Ringius et al. (2002) we concentrate on four 
burden sharing rules that are of particular interest in the current political and academic debate: 
the egalitarian, the grandfathering, the ability-to-pay and the polluter-pays rule. Taking into 
account the different notions of historical responsibility discussed in the previous section, the 
polluter-pays approach enters our survey in two different versions, i.e. based either on current 
or on historical GHG emissions. We follow the concept of excusable ignorance and choose 
1990 as the relevant cut-off point. In addition to these established concepts, we introduce a 
burden sharing mechanism that is inspired by the beneficiary-pays principle to be understood 
as benefitting from (past) emissions (e.g., Wicksell 1958, Caney 2006). This concept is 
closely related to the responsibility concerns of the polluter-pays rule but instead of 
production-based emissions this rule is guided by consumer-based emissions. The main idea 
of the consumer-pays rule is that production-based accounting systems do not adequately 
reflect connections between economies in terms of international trade and investment flows 
and “might result in a misleading analysis of the underlying driving forces of global, regional, 
and national emission trends and mitigation policies” (Peters et al. 2011: p. 8903). Taking into 
account the emissions embodied in trade (i.e. emissions to produce exported goods less the 
emissions in other countries to produce imported), the picture of the origin of global 
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emissions changes. Peters et al. (2011) estimate that 11% of the growth in global CO2 
emissions between 1990 and 2008 can be attributed to consumption in developed countries 
while the production-based inventory projects a 3% reduction. Similarly, using 2004 data, 
Davis and Caldeira (2010) find that 22.5% of Chinese emissions were exported to foreign 
regions while emissions imported to the USA exceed those of any other country in the world. 
This is why a significant share of growth in the consumption of developed countries is 
included in the emission inventories of developing countries. Therefore, since most rich 
countries are net importers of emissions and most developing countries are net exporter of 
emissions, a consumption-based inventory meaningfully changes the responsibilities for 
emissions among countries: While from a production-based perspective China is the world’s 
largest emitter of GHG emissions, the USA lead the ranking if consumption based emissions 
are considered (Peters et al. 2011, Supporting Information Index). Potential national or 
individual impacts concerning burden sharing implications of switching from a production-
based to a consumption-based system in global trading scheme are difficult to project and 
inter alia crucially depend on the price elasticity of demand. Similarly to the polluter-pays 
rule, we propose two versions of the consumer-pays principle in our survey. The first version 
only includes current emissions; the second one covers a broader time interval from 1990 to 
present. Table 1 summarizes the different burden sharing rules together with the verbatim 
description offered to the survey participants: We consider an egalitarian rule (EGA), a 
grandfathering rule (GRA), an ability-to-pay rule (ABI), a polluter-pays rule based on current 
emissions (POL2011) or on average historical GHG emissions since 1990 (POL1990) and, 
equivalently, a consumer-pays approach (CON1990 or CON2011). In the corresponding 
survey question, participants were asked to assign weights ≥ 0% to eight different response 
categories, each of them containing a single burden sharing rule (EGA, GRA, ABI, POL1990, 
POL2011, CON1990, CON2011) or an open-space category. Total weights should sum up to 
100%. After describing the data, our analysis starts with a discussion on the number of burden 
sharing rules that are included within the individual bundles. We further discuss the 
distribution of weights within these bundles and then assess the deviation from the corner 
position of the optimal burden sharing rule in terms of mitigation costs. 
3.2. Data description  
We derive data for the empirical analysis from a world-wide survey conducted by means of a 
standardized questionnaire that was sent via email to 5,767 agents involved in climate policy 
in April 2012. We took the addresses from official UNFCCC lists of participants from COP-
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16 in 2010 and COP-17 in 2011 1. Furthermore, we contacted UNFCCC national focal points 
for further information on national climate negotiators. All participants obtained an individual 
login to an online survey in order to control access and ensure that the questionnaire is only 
filled out once by each individual. In addition, we provide a fillable PDF form of the survey 
for participants with limited web access that could be sent back via email, postal mail or fax. 
Two reminders (including some additional contact details obtained from the previous rounds) 
were mailed in May and June 2012. The questionnaire consists of seven parts: Part A contains 
individual perceptions of consequences of climate change, Part B asks for the assessment of 
the importance of international efforts in combating climate change and Part C aims at 
deriving personal attitudes towards important issues in climate policy. Part D tries to cover 
bargaining positions of different players in international climate negotiations, Part E focusses 
on individual preferences for different burden sharing rules to distribute GHG emission 
reduction targets, Part F refers to alternative institutional frameworks (e.g., voting rules) for 
international climate agreements and Part G includes some personal questions. Out of a total 
of 5,840 contacted individuals, 498 (about 8.5%) from 120 countries participated in the 
survey. About 72% of the respondents provide information of their personal backgrounds (see 
Table 2). Since not all participants share their attitudes towards all parts of the survey or 
break-off the questionnaire, our analysis in this paper is based on 329 observations. 
In order to identify regional differences in perception of different fairness concepts we follow 
UNFCCC party groupings (UNFCCC 2013) and we distinguish between five regional groups 
that may play an important role in international climate negotiations: AOSIS, BASIC, EU27, 
UMBRELLA/EIG and G77 (without AOSIS and BASIC members). AOSIS is a group of 43 
small islands countries that are particularly vulnerable to climate change (i.e. sea-level rise). 
The coalition, mainly consisting of G77 members, was among the first group that handed in a 
draft text that aims at cutting GHG emissions by 20% from 1990 levels by 2005 during the 
Kyoto Protocol negotiations (UNFCCC 2013). The BASIC group (Brazil, South Africa, India 
and China) is a coalition of four large emerging countries out of the G77 alliance initially 
formed during the negotiations on the Copenhagen Accord in November 2009 (see e.g., 
Olsson et al. 2010). The group was initiated and headed by China to commit its members to a 
joint strategy in international climate negotiations. With respect to the BASIC group in our 
analysis it should be noted that we do not have any observations from India in our sample. 
Therefore, when we refer to BASIC in our analysis in the following, it should be noted that 
1 UNFCCC list of participants for the Conferences of Parties remain in many cases provisional due to many ad-hoc changes in attendances. 
Therefore, not all members of the list of participants were actually present at the COPs. 
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the results do not include the Indian position within the group. EU27 represents the European 
Union and its member states. It is considered as an economic integration organization and, 
therefore, itself is a Party to the international meetings but, apart from its member states, 
without any additional voting rights. UMBRELLA/EIG (former JUSSCANNZ group) is a 
loose alliance of industrialized countries which are not members of the EU. The non-formal 
member list includes Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, the Ukraine 
and the US, additionally supported by the members of the Environmental Integrity Group 
(EIG) (formed in 2000) consisting of Mexico, Liechtenstein, Monaco, the Republic of Korea 
and Switzerland. We provide an overview of the different groups in Table 2. 
78.5% of the respondents participated as members of national parties in COP 2010 or/and 
COP 2011 (Table 3). 6.3% of the survey participants live within AOSIS, 10.7% within 
BASIC, 23.2% within EU27, 10.9% within UMBRELLA/EIG and 42.6% in G77 (without 
AOSIS and BASIC members). The respective frequencies for all potential survey participants 
(i.e. for those we obtained contact details) are 9.6%, 13.4%, 17.4%, 14.0% and 42.5%. That 
is, we have slightly higher shares for EU27 survey participants in our sample in contrast to 
our initial list. 
3.3. Descriptive results  
A large majority of participants of over 70% of the sample supports a reduction in global 
GHG emissions up to 2050 compared to 1990 levels, with an overall mean percentage global 
reduction of 38.8% including all participants (Table 4). Perceptions on a collective target 
differ among country groups being highest in EU27 (59.7% reduction) and lowest in BASIC 
(10.1%). The descriptive results suggest that developed countries from EU27 or 
UMBRELLA/EIG prefer a more stringent aggregate abatement level than negotiators from 
developing (mainly from G77 group) or emerging countries (BASIC). Despite these 
differences with respect to the aggregated mitigation levels there is broad support for a variety 
of burden sharing rules. Descriptive results indicate a large majority to make use of 
diversification and to include several burden sharing rules with a positive weight within its 
preferred bundle. Less than 3% of the respondents restrict their choices to one single rule, 
whereas more than 80% assign a positive weight to at least half of all fairness rules (Table 5). 
About 11.6% of the sample gives a positive weight to each fairness rule that was proposed. 
With respect to regional differences, descriptive results suggest participants from EU27 or 
UMBRELLA/EIG countries to rather focus on a smaller number of burden sharing rules than 
respondents from AOSIS, BASIC or G77 countries. More than half of the sample clearly 
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identifies one single burden sharing rule (mostly POL1990) to be the most important rule 
within the bundle (Table 6). About 40% of the respondents do not highlight one single rule 
but rather give an equal highest weight to at least two different fairness rules (mostly 
POL1990 and POL2011). The descriptive results again shed some light on regional 
differences. More than two third of the negotiators from BASIC assign a unique highest 
weight to one single rule (mostly POL1990). In contrast, respondents from UMBRELLA/EIG 
are more likely to spread equal highest weights to more than one single rule. Interestingly, 
negotiators from EU27 or UMBRELLA/EIG countries choose EGA to be the most important 
principle only if they assign a unique highest weight to one single rule. This choice differs if 
participants from these two regions identify two or more rules to be most important at the 
same time. In most of these cases, negotiators combine the POL2011 and CON2011 approach 
(or ABI) but not EGA. This last descriptive observation suggests that decision behavior 
among negotiators may not only be traced back to regional differences but also to individual 
perceptions of fairness within national delegation groups. Mean weights for the different 
burden sharing mechanisms across all participants and separated according to the key regions 
are shown in Table 7 and illustrated in Figure 1. Averaged over all participants, the highest 
weight is assigned to the POL principle, both in the 2011 (19.3%) and 1990 version (18.8%), 
followed by the ABI concept (14.0%). This is in line with the empirical findings of Lange et 
al. 2007 and Hjerpe et al. 2011. Interestingly, all burden sharing rules on average receive a 
weight larger than 10%. That is, many negotiators support the different approaches to some 
extent. However, weights differ significantly. Differences in the perception of fairness 
concepts among country groups are most sever concerning EGA and the POL1990 approach. 
Participants from AOSIS, BASIC and G77 assign the highest weight to POL1990 and broadly 
oppose against EGA. In contrast, negotiators from industrialized countries stress the 
importance of EGA. This result is rather surprising since the principle of equal per capita 
emissions is often claimed in the public debate on international climate policy. In contrast, 
within EU27, EGA is considered to be together with the POL2011 principle the most 
important burden sharing concept (20.3% each). Analogously, participants from non-EU 
industrialized countries, on average, assign the second highest weight to EGA (17.5%), being 
close to the most important concept, the POL2011 rule (18.0%). In contrast to G77 or AOSIS 
negotiators, participants from BASIC countries put lower weights to the POL approaches and 
higher weights to CON, i.e. shifting responsibilities from producers to consumers. There is 
also quite strong support for consumer oriented approaches based on current emissions in the 
developed world, especially in UMBRELLA/EIG countries (17.1%) but this stands in conflict 
15 
to the assessment in AOSIS (9.2%) and G77 countries (9.4%). Table 8 reports substantial 
opposition rates (i.e. a zero-weight is assigned to a corresponding rule) for GRA and EGA. 
More than a fourth of all respondents do not include these rules into their preferred bundle. 
Opposition rates on average are lowest for ABI and POL2011 (14%). Again, regional 
differences can be observed. AOSIS and BASIC strongly oppose against an approach of 
equal-per capita emissions. Similarly, opposition rates for G77 countries are largest for EGA 
and GRA. In contrast, EU27 negotiators avoid GRA and consumption-based approaches. 
Similarly, UMBRELLA/EIG participants oppose against GRA and a consumption-based 
approach based on historical emissions. In the following we present results from a series of 
econometric regression models to investigate whether these differences resulting from 
descriptive observations are significant in an econometric analysis.  
3.4. Econometric models and variables 
The major part of the explanatory variables that enter our econometric analysis is taken from 
self-reported information of participants in the final section of our questionnaire. To capture 
regional differences on fairness, we distinguish between the four major key regions as 
discussed in the previous section. The indicator variable AOSIS takes the value one if the 
respondent’s stated home country is a member of the AOSIS group. Analogously, we take 
into account indicator variables on EU27, BASIC and UMBRELLA/EIG. That is, in our 
econometric models where country groups enter as explanatory variables, mainly the G77 
group (without its AOSIS and BASIC members) serves as the base category. Throughout the 
paper we refer to “G77” if we make comparisons of estimated coefficients for regional 
indicator variables in contrast to the base category. We amplify our analysis by further 
including economic performance indicators from different data sources that may help to 
explain differences in choice behavior. The variable “GDPpc2011” contains World Bank data 
on per capita GDP for 2011 or latest available data (in current 1,000 US$) for the 
respondent’s home country (The World Bank 2012). Analogously, HDI2011 takes the value 
one if the corresponding party is characterized as a country with “very high human 
development” according to the Human Development Indicator of 2011 (UNDP 2011) and 
CO2pc2011 covers CO2 emissions for 2011 on a per capita base (in t CO2) taken from the 
European Commission Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR 2011). 
In order to address potential impacts on aspiration formation such as vulnerability, bargaining 
power or need for an agreement we include several variables that assess individual attitudes 
towards the current negotiation process. NEGCONS equals one if a respondent assess the 
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consequences of climate change on future living conditions up to 2100 in the respective home 
country to be “very negative” or “negative”. The variable POWERFUL takes the value one if 
the self-reported bargaining position in international climate negotiations is perceived to be 
“very powerful” or “powerful”. Moreover, we control for the assessment on mitigation efforts 
by the two largest emitters, China and the USA. LOWRED_US_CHN equals one if the 
interviewee expects GHG emissions reductions in these two countries relative to BAU 
without any new international climate agreement up to 2050 to a “low degree” or “no degree”. 
We further include sociodemographic information as control variables. We look at potential 
age effects on attitudes towards burden sharing rules (AGE in years) and we take into account 
that the perception of fairness may differ between man and women (FEMALE). Moreover we 
control for the educational background such that the variable ECON equals one if individual’s 
highest degree is obtained in the field of economics or business administration and NGO 
equals one if the respondent works for a nongovernmental organization. Furthermore 
COPparty controls for the participants’ positions during COP2010 and COP2011 and takes 
the value one if the respondent was a delegation member of a party in both conferences. The 
indicator variable ADJUSTED is introduced for technical reasons. For 16 observations that 
enter our analysis, the sum of weights either falls below or exceeds 100% and therefore is 
rescaled manually to 100. We control for potential effects of readjustment: ADJUSTED takes 
the value 1 if sum of weights initially did not sum up exactly to 100. We provide an overview 
of the explanatory variables in Table 9. Throughout the paper, the chronological order of 
explanatory variables remains the same in order to facilitate the interpretation of the 
estimation results: column 1 controls for country group specific effects with (mainly) G77 
countries without AOSIS and BASIC members representing the base category. In columns 2-
4 in a first step we successively introduce one of the three economic or emission performance 
indicators to address potential multicollinearity problems. These may arise due to correlations 
either within the group of performance indicators or between them and the country group 
indicator variables. In columns 5-7, we successively control for three different explanatory 
variables that may be related to predictions from aspiration formation as discussed previously. 
In the last column, we jointly consider country group effects together with one out of the three 
economic or emission performance indicators of columns 2-4 and one out of the explanatory 
variables which are related to aspiration formation of columns 5-7.2 We choose those 
2 A postestimation analysis on multicollinearity between explanatory variables suggests rather weak evidence for potential multicollinearity 
problems in our models, never exceeding a mean variance inflation indicator (vif) of 1.29. For instance, the corresponding test after Table 10, 
column 8 indicates a mean variance inflation factor (vif) of 1.26 being highest for the variable GDPpc2011 (1.96) meaning that 1/vif = 0.51 
of the effect of GDPpc2011 on the dependent variable is independent from all regressors. In the econometric literature, a vif of 4 (or even 10) 
has been used as a rule of thumb to indicate serious multicollinearity concerns (see O’Brien 2007 for a critical discussion). 
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variables which maximized the log-likelihood in columns 2-4 and 5-7 to identify the 
predominant explanatory sources, i.e. whether attitudes e.g. are driven rather by economic 
circumstances or by pure membership to a certain country group. In each model specification, 
we additionally control for sociodemographic information and the adjustment indicator as 
further control variables. 
The first part of the econometric analysis addresses the question whether participants make 
use of the possibility to combine several burden sharing rules within their bundles. Since we 
have count data (without zero counts), we apply a zero-truncated count Poisson model (see 
e.g., Long and Freese 2006). The dependent variable take values between one and eight, i.e. it 
is equal to one if an individual assign a 100% weight to one single rule and it take the value 
eight if a positive weight is assigned to all given burden sharing rules and to the open space 
category. 3 The estimated probability for individual 𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑁 of observing a count 𝑦𝑖 ∈[1,8] is given by 
Pr(𝑦𝑖|𝑦𝑖 > 0,𝒙𝑖) = Pr (𝑦𝑖|𝒙𝑖)1−exp(−𝜇𝑖) for 𝑦𝑖 > 0, 
with Pr(𝑦𝑖|𝒙𝑖) = exp (−𝜇𝑖)𝜇𝑖𝑦𝑖𝑦𝑖!  and 𝜇𝑖 = exp (𝒙𝑖′𝛽) indicating the expected number of 
occurrence. 𝒙𝑖 is the vector of explanatory variables and 𝛽 the related vector of coefficients. 
The model relies on the Poisson restriction of equidispersion, that is, equality of conditional 
mean and variance. A likelihood-ratio test after fitting a zero-truncated negative binomial 
model does not provide evidence for overdispersion in our sample. Analogously, applying a 
generalized Poisson model does not suggest our results to be affected by underdispersion. 
The second part of the econometric analysis focuses on the distribution of weights. We 
consider a binary logit model where the dependent variable equals to one if only a single rule 
is identified to receive the highest weights (i.e. no equal splits between several burden sharing 
mechanisms). The underlying latent variable framework for each individual 𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑁 is 
given by  
𝑦𝑖
∗ = 𝒙𝑖′𝜷 + 𝜀𝑖 
with iid standard logistic random term 𝜀𝑖. The probability that the dependent variable equals 
to one is then given by 
3 Since only a small minority of the sample makes use of the open space category by suggesting an additional burden sharing rule, we have 
run a model with counts from one to seven as a robustness check. We do not include the underlying tables in the paper since this does not 
change our main results. We provide these results upon request. 
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Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 1|𝒙𝑖) = Pr(𝑦𝑖∗ > 0|𝒙𝑖) = 𝚲(𝒙𝑖′𝛽). 
Λ(𝒙𝑖
′𝛽) is the value of the distribution function of the standard logistic distribution at the 
linear function 𝒙𝑖′𝛽.  
In a further step of the second part we analyze to what extent individuals deviate from their 
most preferred burden sharing rule.  
If an individual assigned 60 percentage points to the most preferred burden sharing rules, than 
the deviation would amount to 100 − 60 = 40. If weights were equally distributed across all 
eight response categories that would lead to an average weight of 12.5 percentage points and 
therefore to a maximum deviation of 100 − 12.5 = 87.5. Analogously, if 100 percentage 
points were assigned to one single, the minimum deviation equals to 0. We therefore use a 
tobit specification with a lower limit of 0 and an upper limit of 87.5 for the econometric 
analysis. The observed variable 𝑦𝑖 relates to the unobserved latent variable as follows: 
𝑦𝑖 = �  0    if 𝑦𝑖∗    ≤ 0             𝑦𝑖∗  if 𝑦𝑖∗    > 0             87.5  if 𝑦𝑖∗    > 87.5           
and 𝜀𝑖~𝑁(0,𝜎2). 
In the third part, the econometric analysis focusses on attitudes towards POL2011 and ABI 
because these two rules on average receive highest support and lowest opponent rates in our 
sample. Since our dependent variable, that is the weight in percentage points which is 
assigned to a certain rule, is limited between 0 and 100 we apply a tobit model. As a 
robustness check we also include binary logit models on opposition rates (= zero weights) 
against these two rules.4 In addition to maximum likelihood (ML) parameter estimates, we 
compute average marginal and average discrete probability effects for selective model 
specifications. 
3.5. Econometric results 
According to the descriptive results on the number of different burden sharing rules that 
receive a positive weight, our results confirm regional differences (Table 10, column 1).5 
4 As a further robustness check we consider two-part selection (type-2 tobit) model to address potential selection effects but this did not 
affect our main observations. We therefore do not include the underlying tables in the paper but provide these results upon request. 
5 In order to detect differences within the respective regions beyond those to the base category (i.e., G77 without AOSIS and BASIC 
members) we have run a series of pairwise postestimation Wald tests after the fitted models on differences in estimated coefficients of the 
corresponding country groups. 
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There is evidence that negotiators from EU27 assign positive weights to significant fewer 
rules than participants from all other country groups except from UMBRELLA/EIG (p<0.01). 
That is, the European position tends to focus more on a burden sharing scheme consisting of a 
small number of allocation rules rather than amplifying a large variety of different fairness 
principles. Similar observation holds for UMBRELLA/EIG but this difference is only 
significant in contrast to the G77 position (p<0.1) but not to AOSIS or BASIC. Moreover, the 
results suggest that economic or emission performance indicators shed further light on 
negotiation positions towards bundles of possible burden sharing mechanisms. Negotiators 
from countries with high GDP per capita levels or, analogously, from countries with very high 
economic development (HDI) are more likely to select fewer rules (p<0.01). This result also 
holds if CO2 emissions per capita are included as an explanatory variable (p<0.01). With 
respect to the general assessment of climate policy we find that the need for an agreement in 
terms of vulnerability leads to broader bundles (p<0.1). We do not observe differences in the 
assessment of own bargaining power and emission trends in China or the US to significantly 
affect decision behavior. If country groups, GDPpc2011 and NEGCONS enter simultaneously 
into the model, the results suggest rather differences in wealth positions than party groupings 
to predominantly explain differences in response behavior. No further effects of 
sociodemographic variables on decision behavior can be observed in our sample.  
The econometric analysis on the number of burden sharing being highest weighted adds some 
interesting insights to the previous observation. The decision whether to highlight one single 
rule or to distribute equal highest weights among different burden sharing schemes is mainly 
determined by party grouping and less by economic performance indicators (Table 11, 
column 8). Even though negotiators from UMBRELLA/EIG countries tend to choose rather 
smaller bundles there is evidence that these negotiators tend to assign equal highest weights to 
more than just one single rule.  
If we consider deviations from corner positions (i.e. assigning a 100% weight to one single 
rule) our estimation results suggest that EU27 negotiators are more likely to assign a higher 
weight to their most preferred burden sharing principle than negotiators from G77 countries 
(p<0.1) (Table 12, column 1). Similarly, negotiators from countries with high GDP (p<0.01) 
and very high human development (HDI) (p<0.1) are less likely to balance different burden 
sharing rules out. If country group effects and economic performance are considered 
simultaneously, differences appear between EU27 and UMBRELLA/EIG negotiators with 
more selective choices in the former region (p<0.1). We summarize our findings by the 
following observation: 
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Observation 1. 
Negotiators from economically powerful regions (i.e. EU27 or UMBRELLA/EIG members) 
rather restrict the discussion on burden sharing of global GHG mitigation efforts to a small 
number of rules than trying to agree upon a very fragmented approach. In line with this 
observation, particularly delegates from EU27 tend to assign a higher weight to their most 
preferred principle. 
This result shows clear tendencies from powerful players in international climate negotiations 
to rather focus on a few key principles in order to reduce complexity and to enhance the future 
bargaining process. Whether this is a promising approach crucially depends on the question 
whether the selection mainly excludes burden sharing rules being of low interest among all 
negotiating parties or if the aim of the selection is to exclude principles that are mainly 
appealing for opponents. To address this question, in the following we turn our discussion 
towards two principles that receive high support and low opponent rates, POL2011 and ABI. 
Table 13 depicts results for different tobit model specifications on weights for the POL2011 
principle. With respect to regional differences there is evidence that support from negotiators 
from BASIC for POL2011 is significantly lower in contrast to G77 members (p<0.05). This 
result stresses ongoing shifts in bargaining positions in current negotiations. While developing 
countries as a rather homogeneous group broadly supported the Brazilian claims for historical 
responsibility in the Kyoto process calling for a polluter-pays rule based on accumulated 
emissions since the industrial revolution, there is a more controversial debate among this 
principle based on current emission levels. In line with material self-interest, the fast growing 
emerging members (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) out of the group of developing 
countries rather try to avoid a predominant role of the polluter-pays principle based on current 
emissions. Further postestimation tests (after column 8) of differences between estimated 
coefficients suggest support rates for POL2011 to be lower in BASIC than in EU27 and 
UMBRELLA/EIG (p<0.05). Countries with high bargaining positions are more likely to 
assign a lower weight for POL2011 (column 6) but this observation does not hold in a joint 
estimation of all explanatory variables (column 8). Rather party groupings seem to be 
reasonable to predict differences in response behavior. Estimation results from an underlying 
binary logit model on opposition rates against POL2011 (dependent variable =1 if weight for 
POL2011=0) adds some interesting insights to this finding. There is evidence that opposition 
rates against POL2011 are larger in BASIC, EU27 and UMBRELLA/EIG countries than in 
G77 member states (p<0.1) (Table 14, column 1). In line with this observation the results 
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confirm differences on the importance of the POL2011 principle being influenced by 
economic performance indicators of the corresponding home country. The corresponding 
coefficients for GDP, HDI and CO2 are negative and significantly differ from zero (at least 
p<0.05). If again country groups and GDP are considered simultaneously, we report 
differences in decision behavior only with respect to different GDP levels but not to party 
groupings. That is, in line with material self-interest, opposition rates towards POL2011 seem 
to be predominantly driven by economic variables than rather group membership. Point 
estimates of average marginal effects report opposition rates to rise by 0.4 percentage points 
(95% confidence interval: 0.2%, 0.6%) for each 1,000 US$ increase in GDP levels of the 
negotiator’s home country of the negotiator’s home country resulting in predicted opposition 
rates of 0.1% for the poorest and 46% for the richest country in our sample (Table 15). We 
formulate our second observation as follows: 
Observation 2. 
Negotiators from BASIC countries assign lower weights to a polluter-pays rule based on 
current emissions (POL2011) than negotiators from G77 (without AOSIS and BASIC 
members), EU27 or UMBRELLA/EIG countries. In line with material self-interest opposition 
rates against POL2011 are mainly explained by differences in economic development. 
Turning toward the ability-to-pay rule (ABI), results suggest positions among party groups to 
be less controversial than among the polluter-pays rule. The regional comparison leads to 
significant differences in the perception of the ABI approach only between the 
UMBRELLA/EIG group and the G77 group (p<0.1) with acceptance rates being even higher 
in the former case (Table 16). This observation is rather surprising since it suggests 
negotiators at this stage to depart from a purely self-interested use of fairness norms. 
Moreover, no differences in average weights for ABI appear if economic performance 
indicators are taken into account. We do however find differences in response behavior if we 
abstract from weights and focus on opposition rates against ABI (Table 17, column 8). In line 
with material self-interest, claims for this fairness concept are more likely to be blocked in 
rich countries than in poor countries (p<0.1). Average marginal effect estimation again 
reveals lower probabilities for UMBRELLA/EIG members to oppose against ABI (Table 18). 
Point estimates predict the probability to oppose against ABI to be 10.1 percentage points 
lower for these negotiators in contrast to the baseline G77 group (95% confidence interval: -
19.5%, -0.8%). Accordingly, opposition rates decrease by 0.2% (95% confidence interval: 
0.0001%, 0.4%) for each 1,000 US$ increase in GDP levels of the negotiator’s home country.  
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Factors that may influence decision behavior according to aspiration level theory such as the 
assessment of bargaining power, consequences of climate change on future living conditions, 
or GHG emissions reductions without any new international climate agreement in the US or 
China does not affect attitudes towards ABI in our sample. We only observe little impact of 
sociodemographic factors on decision behavior. There is however evidence that opposition 
rates against ABI are higher among older negotiators (Table 17). At the same time, younger 
negotiators are more likely to assign lower weights to POL2011 (Table 13). This finding may 
lead to the conclusion that fairness norms do not only differ between country groups but also 
provoke controversies among delegates within groups. We summarize our findings with 
respect to ABI in our last observation: 
Observation 3. 
While opposition against the ability-to-pay rule (ABI) is driven by differences in the economic 
development, we observe tendencies of a more harmonized view on this allocation rule than 
towards the polluter-pays principle. Against material self-interest, negotiators from the 
UMBRELLA/EIG group assign higher average weights towards ABI than those from the G77 
group. 
Comparing this observation with Observation 2 may lead to the conclusion that turning 
debates on burden sharing of mitigation efforts in international climate negotiations more 
towards needs (ability-to-pay principle) rather than towards culpabilities (polluter-pays 
principle) leads to a more consistent view on fairness and helps at least to some extent to 
break the cycle of the purely self-interested use of equity rules which is in line with previous 
empirical findings, e.g., by Hjerpe et al. 2011.  
4. Conclusion 
Negotiating national obligations for mitigation efforts remains a difficult endeavor in 
international climate policy. We have conducted a survey among COP participants to assess 
preferences for burden sharing rules among key players in international climate agreement. 
Since an agreement must be acceptable among all ratifying parties, it is likely that no single 
fairness concept will guide the process. Therefore we address the question whether 
negotiating weights for different fairness principles may enlarge the bargaining space on a 
future climate treaty. Even though our empirical results confirm difficulties on burden sharing 
in current international climate negotiations, at the same time provide some insights that may 
help to enhance progress within the political debate. There is evidence that negotiators from 
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all key regions show their willingness to accept emission reduction allocations that are based 
on a variety of fairness rules like in the EU triptych approach. That is, negotiating weights for 
burden sharing rules may be beneficial in enlarging bargaining space among diverse positions.  
An important challenge remains to identify a set of reasonable burden sharing rules in an 
agreement since suggested weights differ significantly among negotiating parties. Our 
empirical results indicate a grandfathering rule to attract rather modest support on the 
international agenda among all partners. Surprisingly, in contrast to previous empirical 
results, there is evidence that the convergence towards equal-per capita emissions is a concept 
that is rather supported in developed countries while there is substantial opposition against 
this approach in developing countries. While we observe high average weights for a polluter-
pays concept in all groups of countries there is large disagreement on the respective base year, 
that is whether to include historical responsibilities or not. It therefore turns out that shifting 
the debate on burden sharing more towards needs (ability-to-pay principle) rather than 
towards culpabilities (polluter-pays principle) leads to a more consistent view on fairness and 
may help at least to some extent to depart from the purely self-interested use of fairness 
claims in international climate negotiations. Nevertheless, there is little evidence that 
restricting discussions on burden sharing only on mitigation efforts may overcome the 
enforcement problem in a global treaty. To foster the idea of focusing more on needs than on 
culpability, additional topics like technology transfer and knowledge spillover that are already 
on the table in climate negotiations should accompany discussions on how to share the burden 
from reducing global GHG emissions. 
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Annex 
Table 1: Overview of burden sharing rule  
Description Shortcut 
Egalitarian rule: Principle of equal per capita emissions 
If the population of a country amounts to x% of global population, this country should receive x% 
of the global entitlements for GHG emissions. 
 
EGA 
Grandfathering rule: Principle of equal percentage reduction of emissions 
If the GHG emissions of a country amount to x% of global emissions, this country should receive 
x% of the global entitlements for GHG emissions. 
 
GRA 
Ability-to-pay rule: Principle of equal ratio between GDP and abatement costs  
If the GDP of a country amounts to x% of gross world product, this country should receive 
entitlements for GHG emissions such that it bears x% of the global abatement costs for reductions 
of emissions. 
 
ABI 
Polluter-pays rule: Principle of equal ratio between production-based emissions and abatement 
costs  
If the production-based GHG emissions of a country amount to x% of global emissions, this 
country should receive entitlements for GHG emissions such that it bears x% of the global 
abatement costs for reductions of emissions. 
 
POL1990 
POL2011 
Consumer-pays rule: Principle of equal ratio between consumption-based emissions (i.e., 
production-based emissions adjusted by the net trade balance in emissions of a country) and 
abatement costs 
If the consumption-based GHG emissions of a country amount to x% of the global emissions, this 
country should receive entitlements for GHG emissions such that it bears x% of the global 
abatement costs for reductions of emissions. 
CON1990 
CON2011 
Note: The polluter-pays and consumer-pays rules may be based on either current or average historical GHG emissions since 1990. 
 
 
Table 2: Overview on party groupings 
Description Shortcut 
43 member states of the Alliance of Small Island States AOSIS 
  
Brazil, South Africa, India, China BASIC 
  
27 member states of the European Union EU27 
  
Australia, Canada, Japan, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Monaco New Zealand, Norway, Republic of 
Korea, Russia, Switzerland, Ukraine, USA 
UMBRELLA/EIG 
  
133 member states of the G77 group without AOSIS and BASIC members G77 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics on the personal background of the respondents 
 Relative (absolute) 
frequency 
Number of  
total observations 
Home Country: AOSIS   6.3% (23) 366 
Home Country: BASIC 10.7% (39) 366 
Home Country: EU27 23.2% (85) 366 
Home Country: UMBRELLA or EIG 10.9% (40) 366 
Home Country: G77  
(without AOSIS and BASIC members) 
46.7% (171 ) 366 
Party in COP 2010 or/and COP 2011 78.5% 367 
Working for environmental  
or non-environmental NGO 
11.2% (40) 357 
Highest degree or training:  
economics or business administration 
19.5% (70) 359 
Gender: female 26.2% (98) 374 
Age (in years) 45.1 
(Min: 23, Max: 78) 
368 
Note: Number of total observation varies between 357 and 368 because some respondents did not provide information on their socio-
demographic characteristics. 
 
Table 4: Average preferred target for changes in GHG emissions up to 2050 compared to 
1990 levels 
Country group Change in global GHG (in %) 
ALL - 38.8 
AOSIS - 50.6 
BASIC - 10.1 
EU27 - 59.7 
UMBRELLA/EIG - 49.8 
G77 (without AOSIS and BASIC) - 29.9 
Note: Two participants of the BASIC group stated a preferred target of doubling and tripling emissions, respectively. If these observations 
are removed from the analysis, the corresponding average change in BASIC is - 22.9%. 
 
Table 5: Absolute and relative frequencies of the number of combined burden sharing rules  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total 
All 9 19 22 38 37 31 135 38 329 
 2.74% 5.78% 6.69% 11.55% 11.25% 9.42% 41.03% 11.55% 100% 
AOSIS 0 1 0 1 3 2 8 2 17 
 0% 5.88% 0% 5.88% 17.65% 11.76% 47.06% 11.76% 100% 
BASIC 0 2 1 6 1 4 14 6 34 
 0% 5.88% 2.94% 17.65% 2.94% 11.76% 41.18% 17.65% 100% 
EU27 4 3 9 15 11 9 19 0 70 
 5.71% 4.29% 12.86% 21.43% 15.71% 12.86% 27.14% 0% 100% 
UMBRELLA/EIG 3 
9.38% 
1 
3.13% 
2 
6.25% 
2 
6.25% 
8 
25.00% 
5 
15.63% 
9 
28.13% 
2 
6.25% 
32 
100% 
G77  1 
0.71% 
8 
5.67% 
6 
4.26% 
9 
6.38% 
8 
5.67% 
8 
5.67% 
75 
53.19% 
26 
18.44% 
141 
100% 
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Table 6: Absolute and relative frequencies of the number of burden sharing rules with the 
highest weight(s) (𝑤) among regions 
(w) 1 2 > 2 TOTAL Most chosen rule if w = 1 Most chosen rules if w > 1 
All 191 
58.1% 
90 
27.3% 
48 
14.6% 
329 
100% 
POL1990 POL1990;POL2011 
AOSIS 9 
52.9% 
5 
29.4% 
3 
17.7% 
17 
100% 
POL2011 POL2011;POL1990 
BASIC 24 
70.6% 
8 
23.5% 
2 
5.9% 
34 
100% 
POL1990 POL1990;CON1990 
EU27 35 
50.0% 
18 
25.7% 
17 
24.3% 
70 
100% 
EGA POL2011;CON2011 
UMBRELLA/EIG 14 
43.8% 
11 
34.4% 
7 
21.9% 
32 
100% 
EGA POL2011;CON2011,ABI 
G77  
 
86 
61.0% 
40 
28.4% 
15 
10.6% 
141 
 
POL1990 POL1990;POL2011 
 
Table 7: Mean weights for burden sharing rules across different regions 
 EGA GRA ABI POL  
2011 
POL  
1990 
CON 
2011 
CON  
1990 
Other(s) TOTAL 
N 
all 12.7% 10.0% 14.0% 18.8% 19.3% 11.5% 11.2% 2.6% 100% 
         329 
AOSIS 5.5% 16.6% 14.5% 19.2% 23.8% 9.2% 11.1% 0.2% 100% 
         17 
BASIC 9.2% 8.4% 15.2% 14.0% 21.2% 12.6% 14.9% 4.7% 100% 
         34 
EU27 20.3% 7.2% 15.5% 20.3% 12.5% 12.8% 9.9% 1.4% 100% 
         70 
UMBRELLA/ 
EIG 
17.5% 
 
9.9% 
 
16.1% 18.0% 
 
10.5% 
 
17.1% 
 
8.8% 2.0% 100% 
32 
G77 9.5% 9.7% 11.7% 19.8% 
 
24.7% 
 
9.4% 12.3% 
 
2.9% 100% 
141 
Diff 14.8 9.4 4.4 6.3 14.2 7.9 6.1 4.5  
Note: Diff = Difference between region with highest percentage share and region with lowest percentage share 
 
Table 8: Opposition to certain burden sharing rules across different regions (weight = 0) 
 EGA GRA ABI POL  
2011 
POL  
1990 
CON 
2011 
CON  
1990 
TOTAL 
N 
all 26.14% 26.44% 13.98% 13.98% 17.33% 19.76% 23.71% 100% 
 86 87 46 46 57 65 78 329 
AOSIS 41.18% 17.65% 5.88% 5.88% 0% 17.65% 5.88% 100% 
 7 3 1 1 0 3 1 17 
BASIC 38.24% 17.65% 8.82% 17.65% 5.88% 17.65% 8.82% 100% 
 13 6 3 6 2 6 3 34 
EU27 24.29% 45.71% 18.57% 20.00% 38.57% 30.00% 40.00% 100% 
 17 32 13 14 27 21 28 70 
UMBRELLA/ 
EIG 
21.88% 
7 
34.38% 
11 
12.50% 
4 
25.00% 
8 
31.25% 
10 
21.88% 
7 
37.50% 
12 
100% 
32 
G77 19.86% 
28 
19.15% 
27 
12.77% 
18 
5.67% 
8 
4.26% 
6 
13.48% 
19 
12.77% 
18 
100% 
141 
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Table 9: Descriptive information on explanatory variables 
Variable  share (n = 329) 
Group of countries 
AOSIS = 1   5.17% 
BASIC = 1 10.33% 
EU27 = 1 21.28% 
UMBRELLA/EIG = 1   9.73% 
 No information for 13 observations    3.95% 
 
Economic or emission performance indicators 
GDPpc2011 in current 1,000 US$ 
Mean: 18.72 
Min: 0.23 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) 
Max: 115.04 (Luxembourg) 
No information for 17 observations 
 
 
 
 
  5.17% 
HDI2011 = 1 (very high human development) 
No information for 19 observations 
33.13% 
  5.78% 
CO2pc2011 in t CO2 
Mean: 4.79 
Min: 0.02 (Chad) 
Max: 25.74 (Bahrain)  
No information for 19 observations 
 
 
 
 
  5.78% 
   
Assessment of international climate policy 
NEGCONS = 1 if respondent assesses the consequences of climate 
change on future living conditions up to 2100 in his/her 
home country to be “very negative” or “negative” 
No information for 32 observations 
72.34% 
 
 
  9.73% 
POWERFUL = 1 if respondent assesses the bargaining position of his/her 
home country in current international climate negotiations to 
be “very powerful” or “powerful” 
No information for 31 observations 
23.49% 
 
 
  9.42% 
LOWRED_US_CHN = 1 if respondent assesses the USA and China will reduce 
their GHG emissions relative to BAU without any new 
international climate agreement up to 2050 to a “low 
degree” or “no degree” 
No information for 2 observations 
45.26% 
 
 
 
  0.61% 
   
Sociodemographic information  
AGE in years 
Mean: 45  Min: 23  Max: 76 
No information for 13 observations 
 
   
  3.95% 
FEMALE = 1 
No information for 7 observations 
24.53% 
  2.13% 
ECON = 1 
No information for 20 observations 
18.54% 
  6.08% 
NGO = 1 
No information for 21 observations 
10.03% 
  6.38% 
COPparty = 1 
No information for 14 observations 
72.34% 
  4.26% 
   
Consistency indicator  
ADJUSTED = 1   4.83% 
31 
Table 10: Maximum likelihood estimates in zero-truncated Poisson models, dependent 
variable: Number of rules with a weight > 0 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES nrules nrules nrules nrules nrules nrules nrules nrules 
AOSIS -0.0203       -0.0243 
 (0.0670)       (0.0883) 
BASIC -0.0301       0.0374 
 (0.0593)       (0.0592) 
EU27 -0.247***       -0.0417 
 (0.0555)       (0.0709) 
UMBRELLA/EIG -0.123*       0.131 
 (0.0669)       (0.0810) 
GDPpc2011  -0.00622***      -0.00629*** 
  (0.00103)      (0.00144) 
HDI2011   -0.220***      
   (0.0449)      
CO2pc2011    -0.0140***     
    (0.00454)     
NEGCONS     0.117*   0.0739 
     (0.0618)   (0.0581) 
POWERFUL      -0.0553   
      (0.0506)   
LOWRED_US_CHN       0.0409  
       (0.0391)  
AGE -0.00293 -0.00259 -0.00240 -0.00222 -0.00250 -0.00267 -0.00280 -0.00268 
 (0.00182) (0.00176) (0.00181) (0.00185) (0.00188) (0.00186) (0.00182) (0.00187) 
FEMALE 0.0412 0.0318 0.0296 0.0303 0.0252 0.0216 0.0219 0.0247 
 (0.0402) (0.0394) (0.0401) (0.0408) (0.0437) (0.0437) (0.0403) (0.0429) 
ECON -0.0587 -0.0350 -0.0379 -0.0466 -0.0430 -0.0633 -0.0556 -0.0392 
 (0.0485) (0.0492) (0.0502) (0.0517) (0.0529) (0.0527) (0.0521) (0.0499) 
NGO -0.00902 0.0245 0.0105 0.00522 0.00463 0.000260 0.0235 -0.0123 
 (0.0582) (0.0573) (0.0566) (0.0565) (0.0629) (0.0614) (0.0597) (0.0668) 
COPPARTY -0.0200 0.00888 0.00456 -0.0152 -0.0569 -0.0652 -0.0185 -0.00296 
 (0.0474) (0.0463) (0.0485) (0.0501) (0.0506) (0.0483) (0.0489) (0.0512) 
ADJUSTED -0.00227 -0.00500 0.0330 0.0292 0.0624 0.0451 0.0233 0.0239 
 (0.0776) (0.0769) (0.0849) (0.0877) (0.0781) (0.0778) (0.0857) (0.0849) 
Constant 1.969*** 1.963*** 1.925*** 1.928*** 1.804*** 1.937*** 1.872*** 1.913*** 
 (0.0955) (0.0871) (0.0893) (0.0894) (0.112) (0.0939) (0.0944) (0.115) 
log likelihood -596.00 -582.33 -583.77 -588.61 -554.46 -552.46 -607.04 -529.83 
Observations 284 280 278 278 261 261 286 255 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, eight categories 
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Table 11: Maximum likelihood estimates in binary logit models, dependent variable: Single 
rule with highest weight 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES singlerule singlerule singlerule singlerule singlerule singlerule singlerule singlerule 
AOSIS -0.326       -0.155 
 (0.526)       (0.639) 
BASIC 0.396       0.304 
 (0.430)       (0.457) 
EU27 -0.353       -0.454 
 (0.317)       (0.403) 
UMBRELLA/EIG -0.716*       -0.943* 
 (0.403)       (0.501) 
GDPpc2011  -0.00452      0.00534 
  (0.00557)      (0.00776) 
HDI2011   -0.238      
   (0.258)      
CO2pc2011    -0.00406     
    (0.0245)     
NEGCONS     -0.113   -0.163 
     (0.332)   (0.346) 
POWERFUL      0.0721   
      (0.298)   
LOWRED_US_CHN       -0.0620  
       (0.246)  
AGE 0.00785 0.00908 0.00940 0.00981 0.00607 0.00498 0.00663 0.00913 
 (0.0113) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0110) (0.0119) 
FEMALE 0.0465 -0.0111 -0.00964 -0.0101 -0.0418 0.0454 0.0448 -0.0945 
 (0.307) (0.304) (0.306) (0.306) (0.318) (0.318) (0.301) (0.329) 
ECON 0.266 0.250 0.253 0.236 0.128 0.255 0.254 0.170 
 (0.311) (0.304) (0.305) (0.306) (0.311) (0.307) (0.302) (0.322) 
NGO 0.461 0.465 0.439 0.460 0.375 0.318 0.409 0.361 
 (0.431) (0.417) (0.422) (0.425) (0.444) (0.433) (0.428) (0.459) 
COPPARTY -0.297 -0.350 -0.348 -0.370 -0.252 -0.145 -0.300 -0.372 
 (0.319) (0.317) (0.317) (0.318) (0.328) (0.327) (0.313) (0.350) 
ADJUSTED -0.716 -0.721 -0.679 -0.699 -0.777 -0.750 -0.750 -0.772 
 (0.628) (0.606) (0.604) (0.608) (0.658) (0.661) (0.610) (0.720) 
Constant 0.153 0.112 0.0964 0.0331 0.239 0.0206 0.131 0.317 
 (0.635) (0.607) (0.606) (0.609) (0.692) (0.636) (0.606) (0.747) 
log likelihood -189.72 -189.25 -187.78 -188.14 -177.08 -177.83 -194.04 -170.06 
Observations 284 280 278 278 261 261 286 255 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 12: Maximum likelihood estimates in Tobit models, dependent variable: Deviation 
(=100-weight) from highest weight rule 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES deviation deviation deviation deviation deviation deviation deviation deviation 
AOSIS 1.614       -1.247 
 (5.591)       (7.777) 
BASIC -1.341       3.112 
 (3.005)       (2.961) 
EU27 -6.162*       -0.489 
 (3.208)       (4.500) 
UMBRELLA/EIG 0.259       8.026 
 (4.134)       (5.377) 
GDPpc2011  -0.136**      -0.152 
  (0.0585)      (0.0926) 
HDI2011   -4.392*      
   (2.598)      
CO2pc2011    -0.125     
    (0.221)     
NEGCONS     5.832*   5.178 
     (3.467)   (3.412) 
POWERFUL      -2.186   
      (2.905)   
LOWRED_US_CHN       1.534  
       (2.300)  
AGE -0.179 -0.167 -0.162 -0.168 -0.152 -0.139 -0.165 -0.158 
 (0.111) (0.111) (0.112) (0.115) (0.113) (0.115) (0.112) (0.113) 
FEMALE 2.257 2.175 2.199 2.146 1.956 1.685 1.785 2.015 
 (2.412) (2.422) (2.423) (2.420) (2.568) (2.443) (2.333) (2.593) 
ECON -1.025 -0.00835 -0.109 -0.397 -0.171 -1.141 -0.585 -0.304 
 (2.946) (3.063) (3.040) (3.017) (3.060) (2.999) (2.968) (3.151) 
NGO -4.491 -2.993 -3.396 -3.188 -4.014 -4.357 -2.890 -4.434 
 (3.264) (3.427) (3.273) (3.258) (3.552) (3.410) (3.348) (3.826) 
COPPARTY 0.290 1.115 0.904 0.502 -1.496 -2.966 0.281 0.555 
 (3.082) (3.121) (3.144) (3.130) (3.269) (3.016) (3.081) (3.458) 
ADJUSTED 3.852 3.789 4.757 4.423 5.049 3.820 4.675 4.451 
 (4.011) (4.035) (4.186) (4.128) (4.516) (4.535) (4.118) (4.575) 
Constant 70.92*** 70.35*** 69.32*** 69.01*** 64.12*** 70.91*** 67.88*** 65.30*** 
 (5.379) (5.090) (5.060) (5.057) (5.881) (5.364) (5.349) (6.141) 
log likelihood -1219.57 -1202.10 -1196.19 -1197.64 -1126.43 -1119.81 -1232.34 -1095.13 
Observations 284 280 278 278 261 261 286 255 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 13: Maximum likelihood estimates in Tobit models, dependent variable: Weight for 
POL 2011 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES POL2011 POL2011 POL2011 POL2011 POL2011 POL2011 POL2011 POL2011 
AOSIS 1.236       -2.102 
 (3.253)       (3.770) 
BASIC -7.625**       -8.390** 
 (3.484)       (3.401) 
EU27 0.150       2.600 
 (3.441)       (5.266) 
UMBRELLA/EIG -2.190       3.064 
 (4.280)       (5.125) 
GDPpc2011  -0.0631      -0.141 
  (0.0702)      (0.111) 
HDI2011   -1.460      
   (1.002)      
CO2pc2011    -0.162     
    (0.218)     
NEGCONS     -4.347    
     (4.088)    
POWERFUL      -5.464**  -3.164 
      (2.696)  (2.979) 
LOWRED_US_CHN       3.300  
       (2.307)  
AGE 0.285** 0.309** 0.313*** 0.311** 0.276** 0.271** 0.299** 0.276** 
 (0.117) (0.119) (0.120) (0.122) (0.122) (0.123) (0.119) (0.118) 
FEMALE 0.793 0.882 1.231 1.013 0.659 0.400 0.511 0.738 
 (2.519) (2.547) (2.619) (2.575) (2.887) (2.683) (2.482) (2.723) 
ECON 1.915 2.093 2.170 2.116 2.066 2.219 1.707 2.782 
 (3.215) (3.272) (3.222) (3.240) (3.327) (3.238) (3.181) (3.347) 
NGO -1.158 -0.909 -1.726 -1.131 0.623 -0.426 -0.911 0.0184 
 (2.838) (2.869) (2.797) (2.864) (3.223) (3.064) (2.972) (3.355) 
COPPARTY -0.675 0.257 0.118 -0.129 0.149 -1.814 0.358 -1.586 
 (2.872) (3.151) (3.017) (2.989) (3.213) (3.060) (2.936) (3.430) 
ADJUSTED 0.0892 1.120 1.681 1.654 0.490 0.576 2.294 -0.941 
 (4.491) (4.551) (4.578) (4.565) (5.182) (4.964) (4.613) (4.814) 
Constant 6.203 4.264 6.841 3.986 7.748 7.438 2.184 9.155 
 (5.594) (5.525) (5.906) (5.406) (6.607) (5.582) (5.577) (5.601) 
log likelihood -1118.81 -1104.35 -1095.38 -1096.31 -1020.90 -1010.49 -1125.49 -983.82 
Observations 284 280 278 278 261 261 286 254 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
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Table 14: Maximum likelihood estimates in binary logit models, dependent variable: 
Opposition (= zero weight) against POL2011 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES OPP 
POL2011 
OPP 
POL2011 
OPP 
POL2011 
OPP 
POL2011 
OPP 
POL2011 
OPP 
POL2011 
OPP 
POL2011 
OPP 
POL2011 
AOSIS -0.371       0.181 
 (1.064)       (0.965) 
BASIC 0.961*       0.753 
 (0.559)       (0.710) 
EU27 0.845*       -0.168 
 (0.476)       (0.556) 
UMBRELLA/EIG 1.051*       -0.485 
 (0.556)       (0.913) 
GDPpc2011  0.0293***      0.0364*** 
  (0.00670)      (0.0106) 
HDI2011   0.742***      
   (0.179)      
CO2pc2011    0.0552**     
    (0.0281)     
NEGCONS     -0.204    
     (0.446)    
POWERFUL      0.761*  0.645 
      (0.403)  (0.518) 
LOWRED_US_CHN       -0.543  
       (0.367)  
AGE -0.0184 -0.0218 -0.0227 -0.0224 -0.0218 -0.0222 -0.0201 -0.0216 
 (0.0153) (0.0165) (0.0157) (0.0163) (0.0154) (0.0160) (0.0155) (0.0170) 
FEMALE -0.438 -0.392 -0.480 -0.391 -0.352 -0.314 -0.375 -0.292 
 (0.485) (0.489) (0.492) (0.468) (0.465) (0.468) (0.462) (0.477) 
ECON 0.556 0.487 0.445 0.483 0.422 0.503 0.512 0.369 
 (0.419) (0.442) (0.430) (0.425) (0.421) (0.426) (0.423) (0.430) 
NGO -0.679 -1.127 -0.555 -0.714 -0.747 -0.626 -0.731 -1.057 
 (0.666) (0.777) (0.673) (0.698) (0.711) (0.682) (0.713) (0.855) 
COPPARTY 0.274 -0.0726 0.0164 0.167 0.202 0.434 0.115 -0.0424 
 (0.477) (0.503) (0.491) (0.476) (0.468) (0.455) (0.467) (0.523) 
ADJUSTED 0.426 0.391 0.0202 0.100 0.219 0.353 0.0692 0.713 
 (0.864) (0.841) (0.881) (0.807) (0.796) (0.831) (0.789) (0.838) 
Constant -1.808* -1.555* -3.105*** -1.311 -0.810 -1.453* -0.876 -1.769 
 (0.935) (0.858) (0.970) (0.804) (0.912) (0.797) (0.813) (1.190) 
log likelihood -102.06 -96.78 -95.88 -103.45 -104.18 -100.51 -106.66 -88.57 
Observations 284 280 278 278 261 261 286 255 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 15: Average marginal and discrete probability effects estimates in binary logit models, 
dependent variable: Opposition (= zero weight) against POL2011 
Explanatory 
variables 
dy/dx [95% Conf. Intervall] 
AOSIS   0.020  -0.197   0.237 
BASIC   0.091  -0.101   0.283 
EU27  -0.017  -0.126   0.092 
UMBRELLA/EIG  -0.046  -0.191   0.100 
GDPpc2011   0.004***   0.002   0.006 
POWERFUL   0.073  -0.051   0.198 
AGE  -0.002  -0.006     0.001 
FEMALE  -0.026  -0.118   0.065 
ECON   0.055  -0.051   0.162 
NGO  -0.081  -0.182   0.021 
COPPARTY   0.023  -0.077   0.123 
ADJUSTED   0.095  -0.160     0.350 
Average marginal and probability effects are calculated after the ML estimation reported in Table 14, column (8), *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
36 
Table 16: Maximum likelihood estimates in Tobit models, dependent variable: Weight for 
ABI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES ABI ABI ABI ABI ABI ABI ABI ABI 
AOSIS 2.583       1.991 
 (2.623)       (2.893) 
BASIC 2.135       4.756 
 (2.647)       (2.991) 
EU27 2.141       2.556 
 (2.409)       (3.201) 
UMBRELLA/EIG 4.394*       3.771 
 (2.247)       (2.891) 
GDPpc2011  0.0472      0.0325 
  (0.0399)      (0.0586) 
HDI2011   0.827      
   (0.675)      
CO2pc2011    0.207     
    (0.155)     
NEGCONS     -2.315    
     (2.453)    
POWERFUL      -1.115  -2.307 
      (1.918)  (2.123) 
LOWRED_US_CHN       -2.191  
       (1.583)  
AGE -0.0959 -0.100 -0.102 -0.110 -0.111 -0.0862 -0.0959 -0.0841 
 (0.0769) (0.0763) (0.0760) (0.0769) (0.0795) (0.0806) (0.0757) (0.0819) 
FEMALE 0.335 0.198 0.116 0.168 0.325 0.738 1.301 -0.597 
 (1.952) (1.955) (1.966) (1.969) (2.188) (2.137) (2.014) (2.051) 
ECON 1.959 2.049 2.138 2.090 1.707 1.941 2.202 1.815 
 (1.991) (1.965) (1.991) (1.993) (2.064) (1.991) (1.968) (2.007) 
NGO -2.811 -3.148 -2.594 -2.689 -3.239 -3.228 -2.971 -2.705 
 (2.432) (2.425) (2.467) (2.489) (2.807) (2.779) (2.611) (2.693) 
COPPARTY 0.00152 -0.666 -0.599 -0.416 0.456 -0.906 -0.336 -0.989 
 (2.263) (2.218) (2.204) (2.199) (2.250) (2.267) (2.194) (2.349) 
ADJUSTED 0.817 0.426 0.130 -0.0844 1.726 1.746 -0.700 3.215 
 (2.931) (2.853) (2.898) (2.842) (2.770) (2.639) (2.961) (2.742) 
Constant 15.38*** 16.57*** 15.16*** 16.64*** 19.10*** 17.49*** 17.89*** 15.46*** 
 (4.596) (4.386) (4.719) (4.407) (4.980) (4.578) (4.384) (4.854) 
log likelihood -1014.89 -1000.67 -992.88 -993.55 -940.93 -942.04 -1026.81 -909.21 
Observations 284 280 278 278 261 261 286 254 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 17: Maximum likelihood estimates in binary logit models, dependent variable: 
Opposition (= zero weight) against ABI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES OPP  
ABI 
OPP  
ABI 
OPP  
ABI 
OPP  
ABI 
OPP  
ABI 
OPP  
ABI 
OPP  
ABI 
OPP  
ABI 
AOSIS -0.697       -0.406 
 (1.062)       (1.106) 
BASIC -0.343       -0.893 
 (0.671)       (0.881) 
EU27 0.652       -0.151 
 (0.418)       (0.562) 
UMBRELLA/EIG -0.354       -1.337 
 (0.651)       (0.847) 
GDPpc2011  0.0158**      0.0195* 
  (0.00690)      (0.0106) 
HDI2011   0.333**      
   (0.154)      
CO2pc2011    0.0267     
    (0.0308)     
NEGCONS     0.272    
     (0.501)    
POWERFUL      -0.0118  0.186 
      (0.436)  (0.514) 
LOWRED_US_CHN       0.0711  
       (0.359)  
AGE 0.0277* 0.0268* 0.0251* 0.0261* 0.0336** 0.0290* 0.0289** 0.0274 
 (0.0150) (0.0144) (0.0143) (0.0148) (0.0165) (0.0159) (0.0147) (0.0167) 
FEMALE -0.184 -0.153 -0.235 -0.167 -0.106 -0.116 -0.156 -0.0626 
 (0.447) (0.451) (0.451) (0.448) (0.490) (0.481) (0.449) (0.502) 
ECON -0.235 -0.408 -0.412 -0.349 -0.157 -0.181 -0.323 -0.190 
 (0.478) (0.496) (0.481) (0.485) (0.486) (0.482) (0.482) (0.531) 
NGO 0.482 0.298 0.491 0.352 0.551 0.552 0.379 0.579 
 (0.571) (0.623) (0.582) (0.565) (0.565) (0.568) (0.564) (0.644) 
COPPARTY -0.210 -0.205 -0.178 -0.133 -0.112 0.109 -0.136 -0.0960 
 (0.453) (0.472) (0.467) (0.459) (0.487) (0.529) (0.464) (0.525) 
ADJUSTED -0.630 -0.511 -0.668 -0.672   -0.529  
 (1.034) (1.030) (1.049) (1.077)   (1.063)  
Constant -2.987*** -3.157*** -3.682*** -2.974*** -3.538*** -3.292*** -3.047*** -3.238*** 
 (0.834) (0.785) (0.804) (0.766) (1.084) (0.870) (0.843) (0.937) 
log likelihood -108.85 -108.21 -108.08 -110.04 -98.58 -97.29 -111.29 -92.70 
Observations 284 280 278 278 250 250 286 243 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, the control variable “adjusted” was removed in the models (5), 
(6) and (8) due to perfect fits 
 
Table 18: Average marginal and discrete probability effects estimates in binary logit models, 
dependent variable: Opposition (= zero weight) against ABI 
Explanatory 
variables 
dy/dx [95% Conf. Intervall] 
AOSIS  -0.031  -0.226   0.163 
BASIC  -0.070  -0.189   0.049 
EU27  -0.010  -0.128   0.108 
UMBRELLA/EIG  -0.101**  -0.195  -0.008 
GDPpc2011   0.002*  -0.000   0.004 
POWERFUL   0.018  -0.099   0.134 
AGE   0.003  -0.001   0.007 
FEMALE  -0.012  -0.115   0.091 
ECON  -0.023  -0.129   0.083 
NGO   0.084  -0.103   0.272 
COPPARTY  -0.008  -0.124   0.109 
Average marginal effects are calculated after the ML estimation reported in Table 17, column (8), *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Figure 1: Weights for different burden sharing rules among country groups 
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